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1 Introduction
Consider a producer exposed to output price risk. If price risk can be managed with
futures contracts, a full hedge ensures that the producer’s financial position at the
hedging horizon is almost risk-free. However, this is only true if the producing firm
can always accommodate the liquidity needs that may arise from the marking to
market of the futures position. Depending on the development of the futures price
over time, marking to market may lead to interim cash inflows and/or cash outflows
prior to the hedging horizon. Suppose that the producing firm faces a liquidity
constraint in the sense that there is no free cash at hand. If the original futures
position generates an interim loss, the producer will have to raise additional cash
in order to maintain the position. Usually, the borrowing rate is higher than the
interest rate applicable to any excess cash that might be generated by marking to
market. Hence, the producer faces liquidity risk: If the futures position creates an
intermediate loss, additional cash has to be raised which is costly. The producer
will anticipate the possibility of additional liquidity needs arising from the futures
position when deciding about the optimal hedging position in futures contracts. If
the producer can also trade options on futures, he might use these options to manage
the liquidity risk borne by the futures position. This will also affect the size of the
optimal futures position and the optimal production decision.
This paper analyzes the impact of joint price risk and liquidity risk on optimal
output and on the optimal positions in futures and in options on futures taken
by a risk-averse producing firm. Hedging price risk with futures contracts creates
liquidity risk through marking to market. Liquidity risks can be significant1: In the
1See Committee on Payments and Settlement Systems (1998). A prominent example for the
significance of liquidity risks is the case of Metallgesellschaft AG (MG). In 1993, a subsidiary
(Metallgesellschaft Refining & Marketing Inc.)took short positions in long-dated oil forward com-
mitments and long positions in oil futures contracts. A few months later, significant margin calls
from the futures positions created substantial liquidity needs that ultimately led to a severe crisis
of MG: In late 1993, the futures positions had to be closed causing a loss of more than a billion
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extreme case, the entire derivatives position has to be liquidated. In less extreme
cases, there is the opportunity cost of quickly raised cash. The firm modeled here
faces a liquidity constraint in the following sense: There is no free cash available
from within the firm, but the firm can borrow additional funds at a firm-specific
borrowing rate. In addition, the firm can trade options on futures. As the liquidity
risk is an asymmetric risk – it only materializes if the futures position creates an
interim cash outflow – options might be used to alleviate the impact of liquidity risk
on the firm’s financial position.
The paper employs a two-period framework where futures contracts maturing
at the end of the second period are traded at the beginning of each period. In
addition, one-period options on futures are traded at the beginning of every period.
The analytical results are as follows: If the derivatives position entered into in the
first period generates a loss by the end of this period, the firm will optimally sell
fairly priced call options on futures in order to generate funds to cover (part of) this
loss.2 As doing so changes the firm’s exposure to price risk, the futures position is
adjusted as well. If there is no loss by the end of the first period, no options position
will be taken and the firm fully hedges with futures contracts over the second period.
The numerical results show that the firm under-hedges in the first period as a result
of the existence of the liquidity constraint. They also indicate that options are not
used in the first period.
The impact of liquidity risk on futures hedging has been studied by Lien (2003),
Lien and Li (2003) Wong (2004a), Wong (2004b) and Wong and Xu (2006). Lien
(2003) shows that the initial futures position depends upon the firm’s ability to cope
with losses arising from marking to market. Wong (2004a) proves that the optimal
US Dollars as banks and major shareholders were not prepared to provide additional liquidity; the
CEO was replaced. See Culp and Miller (1995) and Mello and Parsons (1995), among others.
2Hence, the paper offers a justification of the hedging role of options on futures. Another
argument is provided by Lien and Wong (2002) who show that options on futures will be used if
there are multiple delivery specifications (delivery options) embedded in futures contracts.
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futures hedge is an underhedge if the firm is prudent in the sense of Kimball (1990;
1993). He also shows that production decreases if liquidity risk is introduced. Wong
(2004b) analyzes the hedging problem of a firm that can trade futures contracts
with two different maturities. All these papers focus on a particular type of liquidity
risk where the firm has to liquidate the entire futures position if the interim cash
outflow exceeds an exogenously given threshold.3 This assumption is isomorphic
to assuming that the cost of covering an interim loss caused by marking to market
equals the risk-free rate for an amount up to the level of the threshold and then
effectively jumps to infinity such that raising external cash beyond the threshold is
ruled out. In contrast, our model follows Korn (2004) by assuming that there is no
such borrowing threshold but that all borrowing has to be done at a firm-specific
borrowing rate depending on the firm’s credit standing. It seems more appropriate
for most firms to assume that there is no such extreme jump in the cost of raising
additional cash. As a consequence, the firm is able to maintain its futures position
even if the interim losses are significant.
The two papers that are closest to ours are Korn (2004) and Wong and Xu (2006).
Korn (2004) analyzes optimal forward hedging. His model is based on the assump-
tion that the firm will have to provide cash as collateral if the forward position has
a negative market value prior to the hedging horizon. Unlike our model, an interim
cash inflow from the forward position is not permitted in Korn’s (2004) model. More
importantly, Korn (2004) does not allow for options whereas our model does. To our
knowledge, Wong and Xu’s (2006) model is the first to incorporate options (on the
firm’s output) into the futures hedging problem. In their model, however, the firm
has to liquidate any derivatives position if the interim loss exceeds an exogenously
given threshold. Our model, in contrast, uses a more flexible approach by assuming
3The same applies to Deep’s (2002) model. Zhoo (1998) analyzes the implications of a closely
related assumption on futures pricing.
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a firm-specific borrowing rate that allows the firm to borrow larger amounts, though
always at a cost. In sum, the present paper’s contribution is to combine the joint
availability of options and futures contracts with the more flexible, less extreme ap-
proach to model liquidity risk that does not require an exogenously fixed borrowing
threshold.
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 presents the model. As a bench-
mark for comparison, Section 3 characterizes the optimal decisions in the absence of
liquidity risk. The main results of the paper are presented in Sections 4 and 5: The
optimal decisions taken in the second period are characterized analytically in Section
4. Numerical results including the decisions taken in the first period are presented
in Section 5. Section 6 concludes. All proofs are relegated to the Appendix.
2 The model
The firm under consideration produces a commodity that is sold at a random spot
price at a later date. Commodity price risk introduces uncertainty into the firm’s
cash flows. However, price risk can be managed with futures contracts and with
options on these futures contracts. The firm’s optimal hedging decisions are analyzed
in a simple dynamic setting with three dates, 푡 = 0, 1, 2. Futures contracts are traded
at 푡 = 0 and 푡 = 1 and mature at 푡 = 2. One-period call options on futures are
traded at 푡 = 0 and 푡 = 1. Positions in futures and options on futures will generally
lead to cash flows at all three dates.
The firm is assumed to operate under a liquidity constraint: There is no free cash
available in the firm. As a result, any net cash outflow forces the firm to borrow
at an interest rate above the risk-free rate.4 The markup over the risk-free rate is
4This implies that any gain on the spot position cannot be accessed directly or indirectly through
borrowing until 푡 = 2. See Lien (2003) for a closely related assumption.
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denoted by 휏 ≥ 0. 휏 is time-invariant and independent of the value of the firm’s
position in the underlying commodity and its derivatives positions. Cash inflows
at 푡 = 0 and 푡 = 1 will be invested until the next date at the risk-free rate. For
simplicity, the risk-free rate is set equal to zero.
In the following, we describe the firm’s decisions and the resulting cash flows in
detail. At 푡 = 0, three decisions have to be made. The first is on the amount to be
produced, denoted 푄. The cost function 퐶(푄) satisfies 퐶(0) ≥ 0, 퐶 ′(푄) > 0 and
퐶 ′′(푄) > 0. Costs 퐶(푄) are accrued to 푡 = 2. At 푡 = 2, the firm’s output is sold in
a competitive market at a price 푆˜ that is risky.5 푆˜ is distributed over support [푆, 푆].
Producing an amount 푄 and selling it at 푡 = 2 leads to a cash flow of 푆˜푄−퐶(푄) at
that date. Other activities of the firm are assumed to generate a deterministic cash
inflow of 퐼 at 푡 = 2.
The second decision is on the size of futures position. This position is denoted by
푋0 where 푋0 > 0 indicates a forward sale and 푋0 < 0 a forward purchase. Futures
contracts mature at 푡 = 2 and are marked to market at 푡 = 1. 푓푡 is the futures
price at time 푡. 푓˜1 is distributed over support [푓1, 푓1]. The convergence property of
futures prices implies 푓˜2 = 푆˜. The futures market is assumed to be unbiased in each
period such that 푓푡 = E푡[푓˜푡+1] for 푡 = 0, 1 where E푡[⋅] denotes the expected value
given the information at time 푡.6 Marking to market at 푡 = 1 generates a cash flow
of 푋0[푓0 − 푓˜1].7 At 푡 = 2, the futures position expires and leads to a cash flow of
푋0[푓1 − 푆˜].
5Henceforth, random variables have a tilde (∼), their realizations do not. A star (∗) indicates
an optimized level.
6See Wong and Xu (2006) for a similar assumption.
7As Korn (2004) analyzes forward hedging in conjunction with the provision of collateral, his
model only takes cash outflows into consideration but cannot capture cash inflows at 푡 = 1. The
model presented here, however, can analyze both types of cash flows.
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The third decision to be made at 푡 = 0 relates to the position in call options
on futures, denoted 푍0.8 At 푡 = 0, there are call options available with maturity
푡 = 1 and strike price 퐾0 at a premium of 푃0. Suppose that 퐾0 = E0[푓˜1].9 The
unbiasedness of the futures market implies 퐾0 = 푓0. If 푍0 > 0, the firm purchases
call options. 푍0 < 0 denotes a short options position. Trading 푍0 call options at
푡 = 0 generates an immediate cash flow of −푍0푃0. If the holder exercises these call
options at time 푡 = 1, he receives a long futures position with maturity 푡 = 2 at the
then prevailing futures price 푓1. (This futures position has a market value of zero
at date 푡 = 1. For simplicity, we assume that this futures position is immediately
offset in the market. Hence, this futures position will be no longer dealt with.) In
addition, he receives a cash payment of (푓1−퐾0) upon exercise of the option. Hence,
options traded at 푡 = 0 generate a cash flow of 푍0max[푓˜1 −퐾0, 0] at 푡 = 1.
At date 푡 = 1, two decisions have to be made. The first is whether to adjust the
futures position. This adjustment is denoted by 푋1. 푋1 > 0 denotes a short futures
position, acquired at the prevailing futures price 푓1. (푋1 < 0 denotes a long futures
position.) At expiration of the futures contracts at 푡 = 2, this adjustment leads to
a cash flow of 푋1[푓1 − 푆˜].
The second decision to be made at 푡 = 1 is on the size of the position in call
options maturing at 푡 = 2. The premium of these options is 푃1, their strike price is
퐾1 = E1[푆˜]. The unbiasedness of the futures market in the second period implies
퐾1 = 푓1 = E1[푓˜2] = E1[푆˜].10 푍1 > 0 denotes a long position in call options, 푍1 < 0
a short position. Taking an options position at 푡 = 1 generates an immediate cash
flow of −푍1푃1 and a cash flow of 푍1 max[푆˜ − 푓1, 0] at 푡 = 2.
8Due to put call parity, a put option on futures can be replicated using call options on futures
and futures contracts. See Hull (2006, Ch. 14), for example.
9See Chang and Wong (2003) for an assumption made in the same spirit.
10Due to convergence property of futures prices, it does not matter whether the options under
consideration here are options on futures contracts maturing at 푡 = 2 or options on the underlying
itself. For any such options to make economic sense, we have to have 푆 < 푓1 < 푆.
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In order to focus on the hedging role of options and futures contracts, the markets
for these derivatives are assumed to be jointly unbiased.11 Hence, option prices are
given by 푃푡 = E푡[max(푓˜푡+1 − 푓푡, 0)] and futures prices are given by 푓푡 = E푡[푓˜푡+1]
for 푡 = 0, 1. In addition, it is assumed that the futures market is intertemporally
unbiased such that 푓0 = E0[푆˜]. In biased markets, there will be speculative positions
in options and/or futures contracts which could be easily incorporated into the
model. However, the purpose of this paper is not to impose an ad hoc pricing
theory but to concentrate on the hedging role of futures and options.
The remainder of this section focuses on the cash flows resulting from these
decisions. As the firm faces a liquidity constraint, negative cash flows at 푡 = 0 and
푡 = 1 will have to be financed until the following date. At 푡 = 0, the total cash flow
amounts to 휙0 = −푃0푍0. If 휙0 is positive, the firm will invest the excess cash at the
risk-free rate until 푡 = 1, generating a cash inflow of 휙0 at 푡 = 1. However, if 휙0 is
negative, the liquidity constraint is binding such that the firm will have to borrow
at the markup 휏 and repay (1 + 휏)휙0 at 푡 = 1.
At 푡 = 1, there are cash flows from the marking to market of the existing futures
position 푋0, from the settlement of the existing options position 푍0, from any new
position in options 푍1, and from 휙0. Their sum is given by12
휙˜1 = 푋0(푓0 − 푓˜1) + 푍0max[푓˜1 − 푓0, 0]− 푃˜1푍1 − 푃0푍0 +min[휙0, 0]휏 . (1)
Any excess cash (휙1 > 0) will be invested until 푡 = 2. If 휙1 < 0, the firm is
liquidity constrained at 푡 = 1 in which case it has to borrow until 푡 = 2 and repay
(1 + 휏)휙1 at that date.
11Benninga and Oosterhof (2004) show that the representative agent does not necessarily have
to be risk neutral in order to ensure that the futures market is unbiased.
12Given the information at 푡 = 0, the futures price as well as the premium and the strike price
of the second-period options are random variables, 푓˜1 and 푃˜1.
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At 푡 = 2, there are cash flows from producing and selling the output, from the
firm’s other activities, from the settlement of the options position 푍1 and the futures
positions 푋0 and 푋1 as well as from 휙1. They add up to
휙˜2 = 푆˜푄− 퐶(푄) + 퐼 + (푋0 +푋1)(푓˜1 − 푆˜) + 푍1max[푆˜ − 푓˜1, 0]
+푋0(푓0 − 푓˜1) + 푍0max[푓˜1 − 푓0, 0]
−푃0푍0 − 푃˜1푍1 +min[휙0, 0]휏 +min[휙˜1, 0]휏 .
(2)
Substituting 휙0 and 휙1 into 휙2 results in the firm’s total cash flow at date 푡 = 2,
given the information at 푡 = 0, denoted 푊 (푆˜, 푓˜1, 푃˜1):
푊 (푆˜, 푓˜1, 푃˜1) = 푆˜푄− 퐶(푄) + 퐼 + (푋0 +푋1)(푓˜1 − 푆˜) + 푋0(푓0 − 푓˜1)
+푍0max[푓˜1 − 푓0, 0]− 푃0푍0 + 푍1max[푆˜ − 푓˜1, 0]− 푃˜1푍1
+ 휏 min[−푃0푍0, 0] + 휏 min
[
푋0(푓0 − 푓˜1) + 푍0max[푓˜1 − 푓0, 0]




The decision maker is assumed to have preferences over the distribution of 푊˜ that
can be summarized by a utility function 푈(푊 ) that is at least twice continuously
differentiable and exhibits risk aversion, 푈 ′(푊 ) > 0, 푈 ′′(푊 ) < 0. In addition,








푊 (푆˜, 푓˜1, 푃˜1)
)]
s.t. (3) . (4)
Futures contracts are often written on underlyings where the production process
is subject to quantity risk, for example in agriculture. As quantity risk is not the
focus of this paper it might seem more appropriate to model a processor’s decision
problem where quantity risk is usually very small. However, this paper models a
producer in order to keep the analysis in line and therefore comparable with the
literature.
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3 Optimal decisions in the absence of liquidity risk
This paper focuses on the impact of a liquidity constraint on optimal decisions.
In order to establish a benchmark for comparison, this section analyzes the firm’s
decisions in the absence of such a constraint. Hence, we assume that 휏 = 0 through-
out this section. As follows directly from (3), the firm’s cash flow at 푡 = 2 in this
benchmark case is given by
푊˜ 푏 = 푆˜푄푏 − 퐶(푄푏) + 퐼 + (푋푏0 +푋푏1)(푓˜1 − 푆˜) + 푋푏0(푓0 − 푓˜1)
+푍푏0max[푓˜1 − 푓0, 0]− 푃0푍푏0 + 푍푏1max[푆˜ − 푓˜1, 0]− 푃˜1푍푏1 .
(5)
In the absence of a liquidity constraint, any cash outflow from marking to market
can be met without incurring additional cost. Hence, marking to market has no
impact at all (as the risk-free interest rate is zero) and Holthausen’s (1979) results for
the related single-period problem still apply in the multi-period setting of the current
model: The firm fully hedges at 푡 = 0 and production is determined independently
of the (joint) distribution of the risk(s) faced and the degree of risk aversion of the
decision maker (separation theorem). There is no role for options on futures, even
in the multi-period setting.13 The futures position is not adjusted at 푡 = 1. This is
summarized in the following statement.
Proposition 1 Assume that there is no liquidity constraint. The firm fully hedges
its output with futures contracts at 푡 = 0, 푋푏∗0 = 푄푏∗. The futures position is not
adjusted at 푡 = 1, 푋푏∗1 = 0. No position in options is taken, 푍푏∗0 = 푍푏∗1 = 0. The
separation theorem holds.
13Battermann et al. (2000) derive a similar result for the single-period case. In a multi-period
framework, Lapan et al. (1991) show that there is no hedging role for options, given a certain type
of basis risk. Unlike the present paper, theirs focuses on options on the spot and does not allow
for marking to market.
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4 The impact of liquidity risk
We now assume that the firm is liquidity constrained such that any liquidity needs
have to be covered by borrowing at a markup over the risk-free rate of 휏 . Excess cash
is invested at the risk-free rate of zero. The firm’s optimization problem has to be
solved recursively. While the optimal decisions taken at 푡 = 1 can be characterized
without imposing any further assumptions, the decisions at 푡 = 0 can not. Therefore,
numerical solutions are presented in Section 5.
Consider the second-period problem where the decisions on 푄, 푋0 and 푍0 have
already been made. At 푡 = 1, the realizations of the random variables 푓˜1 and 푃˜1 are







푊 (푆˜, 푓1, 푃1)
)]
s.t. (3) . (6)
In order to simplify the notation, let 휅 = 휙1 + 푃1푍1 = 푋0(푓0 − 푓1) + 푍0max[푓1 −
푓0, 0] − 푃0푍0 + 휏 min[−푃0푍0, 0] denote the firm’s cash flow at 푡 = 1, excluding the
cash flow generated from any options position taken at that date.
If 휅 < 0, the firm’s optimal decisions on푋0 and 푍0, combined with the realization
of the futures price 푓˜1, generate a cash outflow. Hence, the liquidity constraint is
binding. As (1) shows, any other cash flow at 푡 = 1 can only be generated by
taking a position in options on futures. If no options position is taken, the firm has
to borrow ∣휅∣ until 푡 = 2. The firm can reduce the size of the loan by shortening
options. Intuitively, we would expect options on futures to play a role whenever
휅 < 0.
Alternatively, if 휅 ≥ 0, the decisions taken at 푡 = 0 and the realization of 푓˜1 do
not create a cash outflow. In other words, the liquidity constraint is not binding.
Intuition suggests that the firm’s optimal decisions at 푡 = 1 are the same as in the
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absence of liquidity risk (Proposition 1). In particular, we expect no hedging role
for options, 푍∗1 = 0, if the liquidity constraint is not binding. The following result
confirms both presumptions.
Proposition 2 If the liquidity constraint in the second period is binding, 휅 < 0,
the firm optimally sells options on futures, 푍∗1 < 0, and chooses an underhedging
position in futures over the second period, 푋∗1 < 푄∗ −푋∗0 . The optimal derivatives
position ensures that ∂푊 ∗/∂푆 > 0 for 푆 ∈ [푆, 푓1] and ∂푊 ∗/∂푆 < 0 for 푆 ∈ (푓1, 푆].
If the liquidity constraint in the second period is not binding, 휅 ≥ 0, the firm
does not take an options position at 푡 = 1 at all, 푍∗1 = 0, and adjusts the futures
position for the second period to a full hedge, 푋∗1 = 푄∗ −푋∗0 .
The first part of Proposition 2 proves that the existence of liquidity risk estab-
lishes a hedging role for options on futures. If the liquidity constraint at 푡 = 1 is
binding, 휅 < 0, the firm optimally sells options on futures and under-hedges with
futures contracts. This implies that a risk-free position (as given by 푍1 = 0 and
푋1 = 푄−푋0) is not optimal given 휅 < 0. The rationale behind this result is based
on a cost argument and a risk argument.
Consider the cost argument first. As 휅 < 0, the firm has to borrow the amount
∣휅∣ which is costly. A short position in options on futures generates a cash inflow
of ∣푃1푍1∣. This cash inflow reduces the amount that is ultimately borrowed from
푡 = 1 until 푡 = 2 and therefore reduces the borrowing costs associated with the loss
generated by the derivatives portfolio during the first period.14
14Selling options on futures, combined with a long position in futures contracts, is (almost)
identical to borrowing at the risk-free rate. See Hull (2006, Ch. 14). Therefore, assuming that
the firm can trade options at a price of 푃1 allows the firm to indirectly borrow at the risk-free
rate. This is not inconsistent with the assumption that the firm, if borrowing directly, has to pay
a markup for two reasons: Ordinary lenders often times are less well-informed about a borrowers
derivatives portfolio compared to exchanges that closely monitor each market participants position.
This is in line with the fact that exchanges are able to classify market participants into hedgers
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Next, consider the risk argument. Selling call options on futures creates an
additional exposure to 푆˜: If 푆 exceeds the strike price 푓1, the options will be exercised
against the firm such that there is a cash outflow at 푡 = 2. In other words, 푊 ∗ is no
longer linear but only piecewise linear with a kink at 푆 = 푓1. The slope of the first
linear part depends on the futures position only, the slope of the second depends on
the options position as well. As Proposition 2 claims, the optimal futures position is
an underhedge. Consequently, ∂푊 ∗/∂푆 > 0 for 푆 ∈ [푆, 푓1]. The size of the options
position is such that ∂푊 ∗/∂푆 < 0 for 푆 ∈ (푓1, 푆]. In other words, 푊 ∗ is inversely V-
shaped in 푆. This minimizes risk as measured by the variability of marginal utility,
given that ∂푊 ∗/∂푆 is kinked.
In sum, given the need to raise costly external funds, 휅 < 0, the firm is willing to
take some 푆˜-risk in order to benefit from a reduction in the amount to be borrowed.
The second part of Proposition 2 shows that options on futures are redundant
for hedging purposes if and only if the firm does not realize any losses on its hedging
position by the end of the first period. In this case, the firm fully hedges over the
second period using futures contracts only.15 Its total cash flow at 푡 = 2 simplifies
to 푓1(푄−푋0)−퐶(푄)+ 퐼 +푍0max[푓1− 푓0, 0]−푃0푍0+ 푓0푋0 which is deterministic.
and non-hedgers; hedgers have to provide (significantly) lower initial margins. The second reason
for why the firm can (effectively) trade at 푃1 is that the exchange can use the futures position as
a collateral for the firm’s options position, guaranteeing that the firm will be able to deliver if the
options are exercised.




The numerical results are based on the following assumptions: The futures price
follows a multiplicative random walk with 푓˜푡 = 휃˜푡푓푡−1 where E푡−1[휃˜푡] = 1 and the 휃˜푡
are i.i.d., 푡 = 1, 2. In particular, we assume that 휃˜푡 follows a three-point distribution
where 휃푡 is either 푢, 1 or 푑, 푢 > 1 > 푑 > 0.16 We also assume that 푓0 = 1, 푢 = 1.25,
푑 = 0.8, prob(푢) = 4/15 and prob(푑) = 1/3 such that E0[푓˜1] = E0[푆˜] = 1 and
the one-period volatility of the futures return is 휎2 = 0.03. The decision maker is
assumed to have a power utility function with constant relative risk aversion of 훼.
Subsections 5.1 and 5.2 focus on the optimal futures and options positions and
their comparative statics with respect to risk aversion and price volatility assuming
that the firm’s output is exogenously given.
Other simulations clearly indicate a negative relation between the markup rate
휏 and optimal output 푄∗. This illustrates the well-known result that introducing
an additional risk (here in the form of liquidity risk) decreases production if the ad-
ditional risk cannot be perfectly hedged.17 In order to save space, these simulations
are not presented here.
5.1 Optimal hedging decisions
The firm’s output is exogenously fixed at 푄 = 100 such that all futures positions
can be easily interpreted as percentage hedge ratios. The deterministic payment 퐼
is set equal to total production costs, 퐶(푄) = 퐼. Relative risk aversion is 2. Table I
presents the optimal values for 푋0, 푋1, 푍0 and 푍1 for different levels of the markup
16The assumption of a multiplicative random walk has no significance for the results. We use
a multiplicative random walk as this implies a constant volatility of the futures return. Chang
and Wong (2003) and Lien and Li (2003) use an additive random walk over several periods. In a
two-period framework similar to ours, Wong (2004a, 2004b) and Wong and Xu (2006) assume an
additive relation over the second period .
17See, for example, Broll et al. (1995) and Viaene and Zilcha (1998).
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rate 휏 .18 The benchmark case of 휏 = 0 (Proposition 1) is given in the first row.
markup decision decision taken at 푡 = 1
rate per taken at 푡 = 0 given 푓1 > 푓0 given 푓1 ≤ 푓0
period 휏 푋∗0 푍∗0 휅 푋∗1 푍∗1 푋∗1 푍∗1
0.00 100.0 0.0 -25.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
0.01 98.4 0.0 -24.6 -3.4 -9.0 1.6 0.0
0.02 96.7 0.0 -24.2 -6.8 -18.2 3.3 0.0
0.03 95.2 0.0 -23.8 -10.5 -27.5 4.8 0.0
0.04 93.6 0.0 -23.4 -14.1 -36.9 6.4 0.0
0.05 92.1 0.0 -23.0 -17.9 -46.4 7.9 0.0
0.06 90.7 0.0 -22.7 -21.8 -56.0 9.3 0.0
0.07 89.3 0.0 -22.3 -25.8 -65.8 10.7 0.0
0.08 87.7 0.0 -21.9 -29.9 -75.8 12.3 0.0
0.09 86.5 0.0 -21.6 -34.2 -85.9 13.5 0.0
0.10 85.2 0.0 -21.3 -38.6 -96.1 14.8 0.0
Table I: Optimal hedging positions for different levels of markup rate
The first column shows by how much the borrowing rate exceeds the risk-free
rate. The next two columns present the optimal hedging decisions made at 푡 = 0.
The remaining columns show the optimal decisions taken at 푡 = 1, conditional on
whether the liquidity constraint is binding (in which case 푓1 > 푓0 and 휅 < 0) or not.
Consider the decisions taken at 푡 = 1 first. For 푓1 > 푓0, the optimal derivatives
position taken at 푡 = 0 generates a cash outflow such that 휅 < 0 (column 4); the
liquidity constraint is binding. Columns 5 and 6 show that the firm sells options on
futures, 푍∗1 < 0, and reduces its futures position, 푋∗1 < 0. For 푓1 ≤ 푓0, the optimal
derivatives position taken at 푡 = 0 generates a non-negative cash flow at 푡 = 1,
휅 ≥ 0.19 The last two columns illustrate Proposition 2 as 푋∗0 +푋∗1 = 푄 = 100 and
18The credit spread for firms with investment grade ratings was well below 2% in the US (King
and Khang, 2005; Yua, 2005; Campbell and Taksler, 2003; Duffee, 1998). However for firms
with lower credit ratings, spreads were considerably higher. Using a sample of bonds issued by
corporations from 15 different countries, Gabbi and Sironi (2002) indicates that bonds with a
Standard & Poor’s rating of B have an average spread of 5.95%, where bonds with CCC rating
have an average spread of 9.05%. More recently, credit spreads have widened significantly in the
wake of the subprime crisis.
19The values for 휅 given that 푓1 ≤ 푓0 are not shown in Table I.
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푍∗1 = 0.
To be more specific, focus on the case where 휏 = 5%. At 푡 = 1, the cash flow of
the firm depends on the realization of 푓1 and any options position taken at this date.
Given 푋∗0 = 92.1 and 푍∗0 = 0, we have 휅 = 18.4 if 푓1 < 푓0 and 휅 = 0 if 푓1 = 푓0.
In both cases, no liquidity need arises at 푡 = 1 and the firm adjusts the futures
position to a full hedge (Proposition 2). However, when 푓1 > 푓0, a liquidity need
arises as 휅 = 푋∗0 (푓0− 푓1) = −23.0. In order to generate cash, the firm sells options,
푍∗1 = −46.4, and reduces the amount to be borrowed by the amount of the options
premium, −푃1푍∗1 = 3.9. This options position generates an additional exposure
to 푆˜. To manage this risk, the firm adjusts the position in futures downwards,
푋∗1 = −17.9.
Next, consider the decisions taken at 푡 = 0. Table I shows that the firm optimally
under-hedges with futures contracts at 푡 = 0 if 휏 > 0. The optimal futures position,
푋∗0 , decreases in the markup rate. For example, a firm facing a markup of 5% above
the risk-free rate only hedges 92.1% of its output at 푡 = 0 with futures contracts.
The economic intuition behind this result is the following: On the one hand, risk
aversion creates an incentive to reduce the exposure to price risk. At 푋0 = 푄, this
price risk is completely hedged. On the other hand, any futures position taken at
푡 = 0 exposes the firm to liquidity risk: If the futures price 푓1 is such that the futures
position generates a cash outflow at 푡 = 1, the firm will have to borrow. Borrowing
is more costly the higher 휏 . Given 푓1 > 푓0, the firm has to borrow more the higher
the position in futures taken at 푡 = 0. As Table I shows, the optimal futures position
is a compromise between managing price risk and reducing the exposure to liquidity
risk: As 휏 increases, liquidity risk becomes more pronounced such that the firm
reduces its exposure to this risk by choosing a smaller optimal futures position.
Column 3 indicates that the firm does not take any position in options on futures
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at 푡 = 0. This might seem surprising as the liquidity risk materializes in exactly
those states in which options generate a cash inflow. Consequently, one would have
expected the firm to buy call options already at 푡 = 0 as a means to generate
additional cash at 푡 = 1 in those states, i.e. to hedge against the liquidity risk using
options. As 휏 increases, the borrowing costs incurred from 푡 = 1 to 푡 = 2 grow
such that the incentive to buy options at 푡 = 0 in order to create a cash inflow at
푡 = 1 increases as well. However, the firm is not only liquidity constrained at 푡 = 1
but also liquidity constrained at 푡 = 0. Any long options position taken at 푡 = 0
will have to be financed through borrowing at 휏 until at least 푡 = 1. This can be
interpreted as the cost of buying options at 푡 = 0. Both the benefit and the cost
increase in 휏 . Our result indicates that the benefits are exactly outweighed by the
cost such that the net effect of an increase in 휏 on 푍∗0 is zero. Consequently, no
options position is taken at 푡 = 0.
This finding is not in line with Wong and Xu (2006) who show that, given their
type of liquidity constraint, the firm should buy call options at 푡 = 0. However,
their model is based on the assumption that there is a liquidity constraint at 푡 = 1
but no such constraint at 푡 = 0. In other words, there are no (additional) costs of
buying fairly priced options at 푡 = 0 in their model but only benefits. Hence, it is




This subsection focuses on the effects of changes in volatility and risk aversion.
Consider an increase in the volatility of the futures price: As proven in Proposition 1,
in the absence of liquidity risk the firm optimally fully hedges with futures contracts
irrespective of the distribution of the spot price 푆˜; options are not used. However,
when the firm is liquidity constrained, price volatility matters: Given that there is
a cash outflow at 푡 = 1, its expected value increases in volatility. Taken in isolation,
this makes futures hedging over the first period less attractive. At the same time,
higher volatility implies higher potential hedging benefits over both periods, making
futures hedging more attractive. Hence, the impact of price volatility on the optimal
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Figure 1: The effect of price volatility on 푋∗0
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Figure 1 shows the optimal futures position taken at 푡 = 0, 푋∗0 , for various
combinations of the markup rate 휏 and the volatility of the futures price 푓˜1.20 Figure
1 indicates that the optimal futures position taken at 푡 = 0 increases in volatility
over the whole range of markup rates. It also shows that this increase is more
pronounced for higher values of 휏 .21 Therefore, Figure 1 indicates that the more
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Figure 2: The effect of price volatility on 푋∗1 and 푍∗1 for 휅 < 0
Figure 2 illustrates the impact of price volatility on the hedging decisions taken
at 푡 = 1, 푋∗1 and 푍∗1 , given that the liquidity constraint is binding, 휅 < 0. It indicates
that the firm sells less options on futures as volatility increases. It also indicates
that the downward adjustment of the futures position decreases in volatility as well.
20Changes in volatility are modeled as changes in 푢 and 푑 = 1/푢, accompanied by an appropriate
adjustment in prob(푑) in order to ensure that 푓푡 = E푡[푓˜푡+1]. prob(푢) remains constant at 4/15.
Relative risk aversion equals 2. The optimal options position remains unchanged at 푍∗0 = 0.
21These results are in line with those derived by Korn (2004) for a different set of assumptions
including the absence of options on futures. The fact that they are not in line with Deep’s (2002)
result is caused by the difference in the modeling of the liquidity constraint.
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Again, these effects are more pronounced for larger values of 휏 .
The impact of changes in risk aversion is briefly illustrated in Table II, assuming
a markup rate of 5%.22
relative decision decision taken at 푡 = 1
risk taken at 푡 = 0 given 푓1 > 푓0 given 푓1 ≤ 푓0
aversion 훼 푋∗0 푍∗0 휅 푋∗1 푍∗1 푋∗1 푍∗1
1.00 86.8 0.0 -21.7 -39.4 -94.7 13.2 0.0
1.50 90.4 0.0 -22.6 -25.0 -62.2 9.6 0.0
2.00 92.1 0.0 -23.0 -17.9 -46.4 7.9 0.0
2.50 93.2 0.0 -23.3 -13.7 -36.9 6.8 0.0
3.00 93.9 0.0 -23.5 -11.0 -30.7 6.1 0.0
3.50 94.4 0.0 -23.6 -9.0 -26.3 5.6 0.0
4.00 94.7 0.0 -23.7 -7.4 -22.9 5.3 0.0
Table II: Optimal hedging position for different degrees of relative risk aversion
The first column indicates the degree of relative risk aversion. (Otherwise, Table
II has the same structure as Table I.) It shows that the optimal futures position
taken at 푡 = 0 increases moderately in risk aversion. This reflects the fact that the
hedging benefits are valued more highly when the decision maker exhibits higher
risk aversion. If the liquidity constraint is binding at 푡 = 1, the firm reduces its
short position in options on futures as risk aversion increases. It also reduces the
number of futures contracts sold. Hence, a firm with higher risk aversion is willing
to accept higher borrowing costs in order to reduce the additional exposure to price
risk created by selling options. Table II indicates that the effect of an increase in
risk aversion on 푋∗1 and, in particular, on 푍∗1 can be significant.
22Gollier (2001, Ch. 2) argues for levels of relative risk aversion between unity and four.
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6 Conclusions
This paper analyzes the impact of liquidity risk on the optimal production and risk
management decisions of a risk-averse firm that can manage price risk with futures
contracts and options on these futures. Liquidity risk created by marking to market
as well as the use of options might create cash flows prior to the hedging horizon.
Our results show that liquidity risk lowers the optimal futures hedge ratio in
the first period. It also reduces production. The optimal futures position is a
compromise between two conflicting objectives: The first is to reduce the exposure
to price risk, the second is to avoid the cost created by liquidity risk. No options
position is taken in the first period. If liquidity risk materializes prior to the hedging
horizon, the firm optimally sells options at the beginning of the second period and
adjusts its futures position in order to cope with the additional exposure created by
the options position. If liquidity risk does not materialize, the problem in the second
period is isomorphic to the standard hedging model such that the firm adjusts the
futures position to a full hedge.
The comparative statics results are straightforward: The optimal hedge ratio in
the first period decreases in the markup rate and increases in risk aversion and price
volatility. The optimal options position in the second period changes inversely.
In contrast to the results obtained by Wong and Xu (2006), our paper shows
that there is no hedging role for options in the first period but in the second. This
difference arises because Wong and Xu (2006) assume a different type of liquidity
constraint in which the entire derivatives position has to be liquidated if the interim
cash outflow created by marking to market exceeds a certain threshold. In such a
framework, there can only be a hedging role for options in the first period. In the
present paper, options can also be used in the second period which, as the numerical
20
results show, is optimal to do if liquidity risk materializes. Hence, the present paper
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Proof of Proposition 1
The optimization problem has to be solved recursively. At 푡 = 1, the firm decides
upon 푋푏1 and 푍푏1, given 푓1, 푃1, 푄푏∗, 푋푏∗0 and 푍푏∗0 . As the derivatives markets are
jointly unbiased, the first-order conditions for 푋푏∗1 and 푍푏∗1 can be written as
E1
[




푈 ′(푊˜ 푏∗), 푆˜
)
= 0 ∀푓1 , (7)
E1
[








Due to the concavity of the problem, the solution is unique. Substituting the
푋푏1 = 푄
푏−푋푏0 and 푍푏1 = 0 as a candidate solution into the firm’s cash flow definition
yields
푊˜ 푏 = 푆˜푄푏 − 퐶(푄푏) + 퐼 + (푋푏0 +푄푏 −푋푏0)(푓1 − 푆˜) +푋푏0(푓0 − 푓1)
−푃0푍푏0 + 푍푏0max[푓1 − 푓0, 0]
= 푓1푄
푏 − 퐶(푄푏) + 퐼 +푋푏0(푓0 − 푓1) + 푍푏0max[푓1 − 푓0, 0]− 푃0푍푏0 ∀푓1.
(9)
As this is a deterministic amount, conditions (7) and (8) are satisfied. Hence, the
firm’s optimal derivatives position at 푡 = 1 is given by 푋푏∗1 = 푄푏 −푋푏0 and 푍푏∗1 = 0.




using the unbiasedness of the derivatives markets, the first-order conditions for 푋푏∗0









max[푓˜1 − 푓0, 0], 푈 ′(푊˜ 푏∗)
)
= 0. (11)
Substituting (10) into the first-order condition for 푄푏∗, given by
E0
[











= 0 , (12)
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and dividing by E0[푈 ′(푊˜ 푏,∗)] > 0 directly leads to E0[푓˜1] = 푓0 = 퐶 ′(푄푏,∗). If 퐶 ′−1(⋅)
denotes the inverse of the firm’s marginal cost function, we have 푄푏,∗ = 퐶 ′−1(푓0).
Consider the vector (푋푏0, 푍푏0, 푄푏∗) = (푄푏∗, 0, 퐶 ′−1(푓0)) as a candidate solution.
Using the same logic as above, it is straightforward to show that the firm’s profits
at 푡 = 0 are deterministic such that conditions (10) and (11) are satisfied. As the
first period problem is concave as well, its unique solution is given by 푋푏∗0 = 푄푏∗ =
퐶 ′−1(푓0) and 푍푏∗0 = 0. As the optimal production decision is neither affected by the
firm’s degree of risk aversion nor by its assessment of the joint distribution of 푓˜1 and
푆˜, separation holds. □
Proof of Proposition 2
The proof is based on ruling out combinations of positions in futures and options on
futures as being incompatible with the first-order conditions. The proof proceeds as
follows: In part (a), we use the first-order condition for 푋∗1 in (13) to rule out all
possible combinations except three. In part (b), we deal with these three cases by
using the first-order condition for 푍∗1 in addition. Part (b) also briefly analyzes the
case of 휅 ≥ 0. Parts (c) and (d) deal with the case of 휅 < 0. Between these parts,
we will present and prove a lemma that will be used in part (d).
(a) Given 푓1, 푃1, 푄∗, 푋∗0 and 푍∗0 , the firm solves the problem in (6). Due to
the concavity of this problem, its solution is unique. As the derivatives markets are
jointly unbiased, the first-order condition for 푋∗1 is given by
E1
[




푈 ′(푊˜ ∗), 푆˜
)
= 0 ∀푓1 . (13)
Condition (13) holds if and only if either 푊 ∗ is a constant for all 푆 or there is
at least one interval of 푆 in which 푊 ∗ increases in 푆, ∂푊 ∗/∂푆 > 0, and at least
one other interval of 푆 in which it decreases in 푆, ∂푊 ∗/∂푆 < 0 as 푈 ′′(⋅) < 0. The
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푄−푋0 −푋1 + 푍1 for 푆 > 푓1 ,
푄−푋0 −푋1 for 푆 ≤ 푓1 .
(14)
(14) shows that the sign of ∂푊 ∗/∂푆 is the same within each of the intervals
[푆, 푓1] and (푓1, 푆]. Hence, if the sign of ∂푊 ∗/∂푆 is to change in 푆, it has to be
positive in one of these intervals and negative in the other.
Next, we use condition (13) to show by contradiction that certain combinations
of positions in futures and options on futures cannot be optimal. Firstly, suppose
that 푋∗1 > 푄∗ −푋∗0 and 푍∗1 ≤ 0. This implies ∂푊 ∗/∂푆 < 0 for all 푆. It therefore
contradicts (13). Secondly, suppose that 푋∗1 < 푄∗ − 푋∗0 and 푍∗1 ≥ 0. It follows
directly from (14) that ∂푊 ∗/∂푆 > 0 for all 푆. Again, this raises a contradiction to
(13). Thirdly, suppose that 푋∗1 = 푄∗ −푋∗0 and that 푍∗1 > [<] 0. (14) implies that
∂푊 ∗/∂푆 = 0 for 푆 ∈ [푆, 푓1] and positive [negative] otherwise. Hence, condition (13)
is violated.
(b) It has been shown so far that the only combinations that do not contradict
(13) are those where 푋1 > [=][<]푄−푋0 and 푍1 > [=][<] 0 at the same time. These
cases will be analyzed next, using the first-order condition for 푍∗1 as well. The exact
form of this condition depends on the value of min[휅− 푃1푍1, 0] at the optimum. If













using the unbiasedness of the derivatives markets. Unbiasedness also implies that


















Let us look at cases now. Assume that 휅 ≥ 0 and suppose that 푋∗1 = 푄∗ −푋∗0
and 푍∗1 = 0. It follows that condition (15) applies. As ∂푊 ∗/∂푆 = 0 for all 푆 in
this case, 푊 ∗ is a constant such that conditions (13) and (15) are both met and the
vector (푋∗1 , 푍∗1) = (푄∗ −푋∗0 , 0) characterizes the unique optimum, given 휅 ≥ 0.
(c) It remains to find the optimal positions for 휅 < 0. Suppose (푋∗1 , 푍∗1) =
(푄∗ − 푋∗0 , 0). In this case, condition (16) applies. 푊 ∗ is a constant such that the
covariances in (13) and (16) are zero, but the second summand in (16) is positive
since 휏 , 푃1, 푈 ′(⋅) > 0. Hence, condition (16) is violated such that this vector cannot
be optimal for 휅 < 0.
The remainder of the proof rules out that 푋1 > 푄∗ −푋∗0 and 푍1 > 0 is optimal
such that the 푋∗1 < 푄∗ −푋∗0 and 푍∗1 < 0 is the optimal decision for 휅 < 0. Before
proceeding, we state and prove a lemma that will be used later in part (d).
Lemma 1 If ∂푊 ∗/∂푆 < 0 for 푆 ∈ [푆, 푓1] and ∂푊 ∗/∂푆 > 0 for 푆 ∈ (푓1, 푆]23, there
exist two distinct points, 푆1 ∈ (푆, 푓1) and 푆2 ∈ (푓1, 푆), such that 푈 ′(푊 ∗(푆)) ≥
E1[푈 ′(푊 ∗(푆˜))] for all 푆 ∈ [푆1, 푆2] and 푈 ′(푊 ∗(푆)) < E1[푈 ′(푊 ∗(푆˜))] for all 푆 ∈
[푆, 푆1) ∪ (푆2, 푆], where the equality holds at 푆 = 푆1 and 푆 = 푆2 only.
Proof of Lemma 1: 푈 ′′(⋅) < 0 implies that 푈 ′(푊 ∗(푆)) is strictly increasing for all
푆 ∈ [푆, 푓1] and strictly decreasing for all 푆 ∈ (푓1, 푆]. In other words, 푈 ′(푊 ∗(푆))
attains a unique maximum at 푓1. Since E1[푈 ′(푊 ∗(푆˜))] is the expected value of
푈 ′(푊 ∗(푆)), there must exist at least one and at most two distinct points in (푆, 푆)
at which 푈 ′(푊 ∗(푆)) = E1[푈 ′(푊 ∗(푆˜))]. In the following, it will be shown that a
contradiction arises if there is only one such point.
Suppose first that 푈 ′(푊 ∗(푆)) ≥ E[푈 ′(푊 ∗(푆˜))]. Hence, a unique point 푆ˆ ∈
(푓1, 푆) has to exist such that 푈 ′(푊 ∗(푆)) > E1[푈 ′(푊 ∗(푆˜))] for all 푆 ∈ (푆, 푆ˆ) and
23Using (13) and (14), this condition directly implies 푋∗1 > 푄∗ −푋∗0 and 푍∗1 > 0.
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d퐻(푆) < 0 (17)
where 퐻(푆) is the distribution function of 푆˜, given the realization of 푓˜1. As the
left-hand side of inequality (17) equals cov1(푈 ′(푊˜ ∗), 푆˜), the inequality contradicts
the first-order condition for 푋∗1 in (13).
Now suppose that 푈 ′(푊 ∗(푆)) ≥ E1[푈 ′(푊 ∗(푆˜))]. There has to be a unique
point 푆ˇ ∈ (푆, 푓1) such that 푈 ′(푊 ∗(푆)) < E1[푈 ′(푊 ∗(푆˜))] for all 푆 ∈ [푆, 푆ˇ) and










d퐻(푆) > 0 , (18)
again raising a contradiction to the first-order condition in (13). Hence, both
푈 ′(푊 ∗(푆)) and 푈 ′(푊 ∗(푆)) are strictly smaller than E1[푈 ′(푊 ∗(푆˜))] such that there
are two points where 푈 ′(푊 ∗(푆)) = E1[푈 ′(푊 ∗(푆˜))]. □
(d) Now, we resume the proof of Proposition 2. Suppose that 푋∗1 > 푄∗ − 푋∗0
and 푍∗1 > 0 such that ∂푊 ∗/∂푆 changes its sign as required by (13). Let 퐴 =
E1[푈 ′(푊 ∗(푆˜))∣푆˜ < 푓1] and 퐵 = E1[푈 ′(푊 ∗(푆˜))∣푆˜ > 푓1]24, where E1[⋅∣⋅] is the condi-
tional expectation operator with respect to 퐻(푆). There are two mutually exclusive
cases: (i) 퐴 > 퐵 and (ii) 퐴 ≤ 퐵. Consider case (i) first. Notice that
24E1[푈 ′(푊 ∗(푆˜)] = 퐴퐻(푓1) +퐵 (1−퐻(푓1)) by definition.
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It follows from Lemma 1 that the first term in (19) is negative. The second term
in (19) is equal to (퐵 −퐴) (푆2− 푓1)퐻(푓1) (1−퐻(푓1)). As 퐴 > 퐵, 푆2 > 푓1 and 0 <
퐻(푓1) < 1, this term is negative as well. Hence, cov1(푈 ′(푊 ∗(푆˜)),max(푆˜−푓1, 0)) < 0
in case (i).

































Lemma 1 implies that the first term in (20) is negative. The second term in
(20) equals (퐴−퐵) (푓1 − 푆1)퐻(푓1) (1−퐻(푓1)) which is non-positive since 퐴 ≤ 퐵,
푆1 < 푓1 and 0 < 퐻(푓1) < 1. Hence, cov1(푈 ′(푊 ∗(푆˜)),max(푆˜ − 푓1, 0)) is negative in
case (ii) as well.
This raises a contradiction to the optimality of 푋∗1 > 푄∗ − 푋∗0 and 푍∗1 > 0 as
the first-order condition for 푍∗1 requires cov1(푈 ′(푊 ∗(푆˜)),max(푆˜ − 푓1, 0)) to be zero
in the case of (15) or to be positive in the case of (16). Hence, the optimal decision
for 휅 < 0 is given by 푋∗1 < 푄∗ −푋∗0 and 푍∗1 < 0. □
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